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INDIVIDUAL'S DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS BAD DEBTS
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Section 1661 (a) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code permits
both corporations and individuals to deduct from their gross income any
debt, other than a nonbusiness debt, which becomes worthless during
the taxable year. A nonbusiness debt is defined in section 166(d) (2)
as any debt other than "(A) a debt created or acquired . . . in connec-
tion with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or (B) a debt the loss
from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business."2 The regulations elaborate on the statute by providing that
the deduction eligibility of the loss is to be "determined by the relation
which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to
the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate
one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is
engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless . . ." the debt is
deductible as other than a nonbusiness debt. 8 (Emphasis added.)
A taxpayer other than a corporation may also secure a deduction
for nonbusiness debts which become worthless within the taxable year,
but these losses must be considered as short-term capital losses' Such
losses, unlike ordinary business losses, are not fully deductible. Capital
losses must first be offset by capital gains before any net loss is deduct-
ible from ordinary income, and, in the case of an individual, there is
an upper limit placed upon the net capital loss deductible against
ordinary income in any one year.'
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166, states in part:
(a) General rule.—
(1) Wholly worthless debts.—There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which
becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(d) Nonbusiness debts.—
(1) General rule.—In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation—
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(33) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the
loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the
taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "nonbusi-
ness debt" means a debt other than—
(A) A debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a
trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the tax-
payer's trade or business.
2 Id.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d)(1) (13).
Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211, which states in part:
(1) In general—In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, losses from
sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from
such sales or exchanges, plus (if such losses exceed such gains) which ever of the follow-
ing is smallest:
(A) the taxable income for the taxable year,
478
DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS BAD DEBTS
Thus, it is to a taxpayer's advantage to be allowed to treat losses
from bad debts as other than nonbusiness losses and thereby fully
deduct them from gross income in the year incurred. The test used to
determine whether there is a proximate relationship between the loss
and the trade or business of the taxpayer, and the factors considered
in deciding whether the test has been satisfied thus become highly
significant. For example, the test of proximateness is of great impor-
tance to a stockholder-employee of a closely held corporation who,
having made loans to the corporation or having been the guarantor of
certain of the corporation's obligations, experiences bad debt losses
due to the corporation's financial difficulties. The taxpayer in this
situation might seek a business bad debt deduction from his gross
income, relying on the theory that the losses are proximately related to
his trade or business of being an employee of the corporation.°
The test for determining a proximate relationship has not been
precisely established by the Supreme Court, and there is a conflict
among the cases decided by the courts of appeal. It has been held
that a debt is proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or business
when its creation was significantly motivated, as distinguished from
primarily motivated, by the trade or business. This standard is gener-
ally referred to as the "significant motivation" test. On the other hand,
several opinions have applied what is called the "dominant and primary
motivation" test. To satisfy this test, a taxpayer must prove that his
trade or business was the "dominant and primary motivation" behind
the creation of the debt. This comment will evaluate these two tests
in the context of several recent decisions involving the application of
section 166 to investor-employee taxpayers.
I. WHIPPLE V. COMMISSIONER
Any examination of the relationship of section 166 to an investor-
employee taxpayer must begin with Whipple v. Commissioner.' In
Whipple, the Supreme Court stressed the basic dichotomy of investing
versus trade or business, and approved the regulation that a worthless
debt is deductible as a business bad debt only if there is a proximate
relation between the loss and the taxpayer's trade or business.' Tax-
(B) $1,000 or
(C) the sum of
(i) the excess of the net short-term capital loss over the net long-term
capital gain, and
(ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital loss over the net
short-term capital gain.
6 Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961), held that a corporate em-
ployee who makes loans to the corporation in order to hold his job may deduct for a
business bad debt if the loans become worthless.
7 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
8 At the time the issue in Whipple arose, in 1953, the applicable statute was the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended in 1942. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(k) (4)
was substantially identical to the 1954 Code provision, § 166. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)-
6(b) was substantially identical to Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b), presently in effect.
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payer Whipple owned approximately 80 percent of the outstanding
stock in a soft drink bottling corporation. In 1952, he purchased land
and erected thereon a bottling plant which he leased to the corporation.
During 1952 and 1953, he made sizable cash advances to the corpora-
tion, the net amount ultimately owing to him reaching $56,975. This
debt became worthless in 1953, and taxpayer deducted the loss as a
business bad debt in computing his 1953 taxable income. The Commis-
sioner, however, classified the debt as nonbusiness and assessed a
deficiency. The Tax Court, after determining that in 1953 Whipple
was not in the business of organizing, promoting, managing or financ-
ing corporations, or of bottling soft drinks, or of general financing and
money lending, sustained the deficiency. 9
The Supreme Court held that taxpayer-petitioner was not entitled
to take a business deduction for the worthless loan to the corporation
since "furnishing management and other services to corporations for
a reward not different from that flowing to an investor in those
corporations is not a trade or business ...."" The Court stated:
9 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mew. 187 (1960).
10 373 U.S. at 203. In reaching the decision the court relied on the following cases:
Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932), involved a taxpayer owning all of the stock of
the debtor corporation, who argued that his trade or business was carrying on a com-
prehensive enterprise of exploiting his own inventions through corporations organized for
limited purposes, and that these personal activities transcended the separate corporate
entities. These contentions were rejected by the Supreme Court because generally he
treated the corporation as an entity apart from himself and not as his agent. Burnet v.
Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932), involved a long-time president and principal stockholder
of a corporation who had to make payment on certain notes he endorsed for the
company. These amounts were deductible by him in the current year under the then
existing law, but to carry over the loss to later years it was necessary for it to have
resulted from the operation of a trade or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer.
The Board of Tax Appeals denied the carry over. The Supreme Court, in approving
the denial, stated that the unfortunate endorsements were no part of respondent's
ordinary business, but occasional transactions intended to preserve the value of his
investment in capital shares. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), involved taxpayer
with large and diversified investment holdings, including a substantial but not controlling
interest in the DuPont Company, who obtained a block of stock of that corporation for
distribution to its officers in order to increase their management efficiency. Taxpayer,
as a result, became obligated to refund the annual dividends and taxes thereon, and he
sought to deduct these amounts as ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
the carrying on of a trade or business. The Court denied the deduction because the
transactions "had their origin in an effort by that company to increase the efficiency of
its management," and "arose out of transactions which were intended to preserve his
investment in the corporation. . . ." Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941),
concerned a taxpayer who devoted his time and energies to managing a sizable portfolio
of securities, and sought to deduct his expenses incident thereto as incurred in a trade
or business. The Court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish taxpayer's
activities as those of carrying on a trade or business.
In response to the Higgins case and to give relief to Higgins-type taxpayers,
Congress in 1942, amended § 23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The amendment did
not disturb the Court's definition of "trade of business," but enlarged the category of
incomes in the production of which expenses were deductible.
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When the only return is that of an investor, the taxpayer has
not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is engaged
in a trade or business since investing is not a trade or business
and the return to the taxpayer, though substantially the
product of his services, legally arises not from his own trade
or business but from that of the corporation. Even if the tax-
payer demonstrates an independent trade or business of his
own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt losses arising
from his own business and those actually arising from act-
ivities peculiar to an investor concerned with, and participat-
ing in the conduct of the corporate business. 11
The Court did not disturb the Tax Court's determinations since it
could not say that they were clearly erroneous.' The Court was
concerned, however, with the evidence as to petitioner's position as the
owner and lessor of the real estate and bottling plant in which the
corporation did business. The possibility that the loan'was incurred in
petitioner's business of being a landlord was not considered in the
proceedings below, and the case was therefore remanded to the Tax
Court.
Regarding the possibility that petitioner's loss might have been
incurred in his trade or business of being an employee of the corpora-
tion, the Court noted that:
Moreover, there is no proof (which might be difficult to
furnish where the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stock-
holder) that the loan was necessary to keep his job or was
otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or
business as an employee."
Thus, the Court indirectly approved of the proximate relationship
requirement. It did not, however, give its explicit approval to either
the significant motivation test or the dominant and primary motivation
test. It merely suggested that it might be difficult for a sole or domi-
nant stockholder to furnish proof that a loan was proximately related
to his business of being an employee, as distinguished from his status
as an investor. In the absence of explicit guidelines from the Court, a
conflict subsequently developed among the circuits.
11 373 U.S. at 202.
12 By virtue of § 7482 (a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 decisions of the Tax Court
are subject to the same review as the district courts as contained in 28 U.S.C.-
Appendix, Rule 52(a) decisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states
in part: "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . . Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless dearly erroneous. . . ." The Supreme Court has ruled that
this rule applies not only to evidentiary facts but "to factual inferences from un-
disputed basic facts." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
12 373 U.S. at 204.
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IL SIGNIFICANT MOTIVATION VS. DOMINANT AND
PRIMARY MOTIVATION
The significant motivation test was first used by the Second
Circuit in deciding the 1963 case of Weddle v. Commissioner." Upon
her husband's death petitioner inherited 60 percent of the shares of
the family corporation and assumed the presidency of the company.
Two daughters each inherited 20 percent of the shares. In order to
obtain a line of credit for the corporation, petitioner agreed to endorse
and guarantee all loans made to it by a bank. Subsequently, the corpor-
ation went into bankruptcy, and petitioner was personally compelled to
pay $34,191 to the bank. Petitioner deducted this amount on her 1955
income tax return. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the
grounds that the loss arose out of a nonbusiness bad debt and, there-
fore, was to be treated only as a short-term capital loss. The Tax Court
affirmed the ruling on the basis that petitioner had failed to sustain
her burden of showing that the protection of her employment had been
a significant motivation for endorsing the note."
In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit applied the
significant motivation test. In support of this test, the court made
reference to the tort principle whereby a cause contributing to a harm
may be found to be "proximate" despite the fact that it might have
been secondary to another contributing cause." The court therefore
concluded that particularly in view of the obtuse wording of section
166, it sufficed for a deduction that the creation of the debt was sig-
nificantly motivated by the taxpayer's trade or business, even though
there was a non-qualifying investment motivation as well."
Several evidentiary factors were considered in determining whether
petitioner satisfied the test. The court indicated that it was not im-
pressed by the point that a comparison of petitioner's salary with
her share of the net worth showed that her only significant motivation
was to protect her investment." On the contrary, the court suggested
that a significant motivation may very well have been the protection
of her employment, for she would certainly have been discharged if
the company had ceased operations through an inability to obtain
credit, as she in fact was when it ultimately failed." However, the
court found the controlling evidence to be petitioner's testimony that
14 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
15 39 T.C. 493 (1962).
15 325 F.2d at 851. The court cited the following authorities: 2 F. Harper & F.
James, The Law of Torts, §§ 20.2, 20.3 (1956); Restatement of Torts §§ 432(2), 433,
439, 875, 879 (1939); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443A at 54 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1962), § 442B at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
17 325 F.2d at 851.
15 In the same year that petitioner's endorsement was given, the corporation
purchased from one daughter 20% of the outstanding stock for $65,000. On this basis,
petitioner's 60% interest was worth $195,000. Her salary at this time was about
$18,500.
10 325 F.2d at 851.
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as owner of the business it was up to her to guarantee the security of
the loan 20 Petitioner's own testimony thus emphasized that her endorse-
ment was motivated by her role as owner and investor rather than by
her role as employee. In addition, there was the fact that at the time
the corporation was in need of the loan it purchased one daughter's
stock. This evidence tended to show that the motivation for the en-
dorsement was not for the protection of petitioner's employment but
rather the enhancement of her investment value. In the absence of this
damaging evidence, the court might have held in favor of petitioner on
the basis that a comparison of her salary with the value of her invest-
ment would support a finding that a significant motivation was the
protection of her salary and employment. With petitioner's testimony,
however, the court could reach only one conclusion, regardless of the
test applied.
A concurring opinion suggested that the significant motivation
test applied to the salary-investment relationship would invariably
result in a decision favorable to the taxpayer because the salary inter-
est, unless so small as to be negligible, will surely weigh in the mind of
the taxpayer in advancing monies to the corporation?" The con-
curring judge therefore applied the dominant and primary motivation
test and concluded that the substantial disparity between petitioner's
salary interest and the value of her investment was sufficient to support
a finding that the protection of her investment was the dominant and
primary motivation behind the endorsement.22 The concurring opinion
found further support for this conclusion by pointing out that petitioner
herself had control over the hiring and firing of corporate employees.
The majority in Weddle analogized from the tort law's concept
of proximate cause in deciding to apply the significant motivation test.
It is understandable to look to tort law for guidance in arriving at a
definition of "proximate" as used in the Internal Revenue Code. How-
ever, the interpretation of the Code presents problems which are unlike
those encountered in tort situations. For example, "proximate" as it is
used in the Code involves a consideration of motivation, whereas "prox-
imate" as used in tort law is concerned with a consideration of causation
in fact." Thus, it would seem desirable for a test of "proximate cause"
applicable to the Revenue Code to be defined by an analysis of those
factors unique to the taxpayer's motivation and to the administration of
the revenue law.
The Weddle majority also implied that in the absence of peti-
tioner's testimony, it might have compared petitioner's salary as an
employee with the value of her investment as a stockholder in deciding
whether the protection of her employment was a significant motivation.
However, this comparison could prove misleading. A relatively small
20 id. at 852.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 853.
28 W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (3rd ed. 1464).
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but steady salary might very well be a significant motivating factor
in encouraging a taxpayer to advance monies to a corporation. On the
other hand, a small investment could provide a significant motivation
for loans if the money were required at a particularly strategic time
or for an especially attractive undertaking. A small investment thus
might have the potential for becoming a large investment.
The concurring opinion contended that the application of the
significant motivation test to the salary-investment relationship would
invariably result in a decision in favor of the taxpayer. It was argued
that this result would follow because the salary interest, unless so
small as to be of negligible value, would surely "weigh in the mind""
of the taxpayer in advancing monies to the corporation. However,
decisions favorable to the taxpayer would not necessarily follow, for it
is possible that the weighing in the mind of the taxpayer could be
something less than a significant motivation. It is worth pointing out
that the application of the dominant and primary motivation test might
very well result in most decisions being adverse to the taxpayer, except,
perhaps, in those few cases where the taxpayer's salary substantially
exceeds his investment. The salary-investment relationship, although
certainly a factor for consideration in determining the taxpayer's
motivation, is, nevertheless, only one factor. It should be weighed in
the entire context of the loan transaction rather than being the deter-
minative factor.
By considering taxpayer's control over corporate hiring and firing
as evidence that the guarantee was not needed to protect her employ-
ment, the concurring opinion injected a second factor that would
preclude virtually any chance of success by the taxpayer. If the tax-
payer is either the president of the corporation or in control of the
board of directors, he or she must have the power to hire and fire.
Since the taxpayer in the circumstances under discussion will invari-
ably hold one of these power positions, the use of this rationale must
invariably result in a decision adverse to the taxpayer.
A conflict among the circuits was created in 1969 when the Seventh
Circuit applied the dominant and primary motivation test in deciding
Niblock v. Commissioner. 25
 Petitioner, on three occasions, had sold
his ownership interest in corporations. On the third occasion he contin-
ued as president of the corporation but resigned after a short time. He
and another person then formed a fourth corporation. Petitioner was
an officer of this corporation and guaranteed certain corporate obliga-
tions. As a result of these guarantees he suffered a loss which he was
originally allowed to deduct as a business loss. Subsequently, however,
the Commissioner determined the loss to be a capital loss and assessed
a deficiency.
The Tax Court held that petitioner's loss from the guarantees re-
sulted from nonbusiness bad debts and was to be treated as a capital
24 325 F.2d at 852.
25 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
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loss." On review, the court applied the dominant and primary motiva-
tion test to petitioner's activities and held that petitioner did not prove
that his status as an employee was the dominant and primary motiva-
tion behind the guarantees. Therefore, the requisite proximate relation-
ship did not exist. Indeed, the court felt that the guarantees were
made to build up the value of the corporation's stock and not to satisfy
petitioner's need for independent employment. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court considered, among other facts," evidence which
concerned petitioner's somewhat unusual contention that his need for
self-employment was the motivation behind his guarantees of corporate
obligations and that the loss was therefore a consequence of and
proximately related to his trade or business of being a corporate em-
ployee. In rejecting the contention, the court stated that on several
occasions petitioner had relinquished opportunities to be in complete
control of his own business," that the Tax Court had found no extra-
ordinary circumstances indicating that his personality would make
future employment problematical," and that the record failed to show
that petitioner would have been discharged if he had failed to make the
guarantees."
The Niblock court adopted the dominant and primary motivation
test because it felt that this test was the only one which would inject
sufficient certainty into the interpretation of section 166. The court
found support for this belief in the language of Whipple admonishing
that bad debt losses arising from a taxpayer's trade or business must be
distinguished from those arising from the taxpayer's activities
peculiar to an investor participating in the conduct of a corporate
business.al However, it is not clear that the language of Whipple favors
the dominant and primary motivation test over the significant motiva-
tion test. Whipple spoke only of the problem of proving a proximate
relationship, not the test to be used. However, the inference could be
made from Whippte's statement on the difficulty of proof" that the
proper test is the one which would be the more difficult to satisfy. A
sole or dominant stockholder would find it very difficult indeed to
satisfy the dominant and primary motivation test. Therefore, this test
would further accentuate the difficulty in proof that any stockholder-
employee would face, which could be the implicit reasoning of the
Niblock court that the dominant and primary motivation test would
inject more certainty into the administration of section 166.
20 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1381 (1968).
27 The court also considered that petitioner had established a practice of selling at
a profit stock in corporations in which he was financially interested and employed, that
his salary was less than half the amount be received from a corporation formerly owned
by him, and that there were no indications that the guarantees were made to obtain
additional salary benefits. 417 F.2d at 1187-188.
28 417 F.2d at 1187.
20 Id.
80 Id. at 1188.
81 Id. at 1187, citing Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. at 202.
32 See p. 481 supra.
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In 1970, the Fifth Circuit entered the controversy when it decided
the case of United States v. Generes." Taxpayer's construction com-
pany had evolved out of a family partnership. Although he did not
exercise control over the day to day operations of the business, he did
act as president. He also was required to sign a blanket indemnity
agreement for performance and payment bonds. When the company
failed, taxpayer was compelled to indemnify the insurance company for
its losses. He therefore deducted on his tax return a business bad debt.
After an initial approval, the Internal Revenue Service later ruled that
the payment to the casualty company did not constitute a business
bad debt. Taxpayer paid an assessment and filed a refund suit in the
district court. The trial was held before a jury, which returned a verdict
for taxpayer.
The district court's sole interrogatory to the jury, answered in the
affirmative, was:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the signing of the blanket indemnity agreement by [tax-
payer] was proximately related to his trade or business of
being an employee of the [corporation] ?"
The court instructed the jury:
A debt is proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or
business when its creation was significantly motivated by the
taxpayer's trade or business, and it is not rendered a non-
business debt merely because there was a non-qualifying
motivation as well, even though the non-qualifying motivation
was the primary one.' (Emphasis added.)
As the Seventh Circuit in Niblock found justification for the dom-
inant and primary motivation test in Whipple, the Fifth Circuit in
Generes found in Whipple justification for applying the significant
motivation test. The Generes court concluded that the language in
Whipple which impliedly required proof only that a loan be proximately
related to the maintenance of a taxpayer's trade or business in order for
a business deduction to be allowed precluded the imposition of the
dominant and primary motivation test." It is possible to support this
conclusion by recognizing that under the dominant and primary motiva-
tion test there exists the possibility that in most cases the decision
will be adverse to the taxpayer." Consequently, the significant motiva-
tion test is the only one which can effectuate the proximate relation-
ship requirement approved in Whipple. Otherwise, virtually no
stockholder-employee could hope to have a bad debt deduction allowed.
" 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
84 Id. at 282.
33 Id.
se Id., referring to Whip*, 373 U.S. at 204.
87 See supra p. 485.
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The court also indicated that it was impressed with the majority hold-
ing in Weddle and its use of proximate cause of tort law to support the
significant motivation test."
The court therefore phrased the ultimate question as whether the
evidence formed a sufficient basis to justify the submission of the case
to the jury." The record included taxpayer's repeated testimony that
he signed the indemnity agreement in order to protect his employ-
ment," and the uncontradicted testimony of other witnesses from which
the jury could have inferred that taxpayer's motivation was the pro-
tection of his employment and salary. The record also showed that no
performance bonds would have been issued to the corporation without
taxpayer's personal endorsement, and that without the bonds the
corporation would have gone out of business'' The verdict in favor of
taxpayer was affirmed.
The dissent in Generes supported the application of the dominant
and primary motivation test as the only test that would inject sufficient
certainty into the interpretation of section 166. The dissent also took
the position that if the dominant and primary motivation test had been
applied, taxpayer's testimony as self-serving in nature would have
been insufficient to take the case to the jury in the face of the evidence
that taxpayer was required to sign the indemnity agreement in order
for the corporation to remain in business." The opinion suggested that
this problem of proof was forecast by Whipple's admonishment that
it might be difficult for a sole or dominant stockholder to furnish
proof that a loan was necessary to keep his job or was otherwise prox-
imately related to his employment." This language of Whipple gives
support to a requirement that a taxpayer present more evidence con-
cerning his motivation than his own testimony. In this regard, it should
be noted from the majority's opinion that there was other evidence
from which the jury could have inferred taxpayer's motivation." Thus,
even if the dominant and primary motivation test had been applied,
the evidence might have been sufficient to take the case to the jury.
88 427 F.2d at 283.
80 The court applied the standard set down in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365
(5th Cir, 1969), from which it quoted:
On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
the Court should consider all of the evidence . .. Ulf there is substantial
evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight
that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case
submitted to the jury . . .. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to
create a jury question. However, it is the function of the jury as the traditional
finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and
inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.
427 F.2d at 284, quoting 411 F.2d at 374-75.
40 427 F.2d at 283.
41 Id.
42 id.
48 Id.
44 See supra p. 481.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit in Niblock found justification in Whipple
for the dominant and primary motivation test;" the Fifth Circuit in
Generes found justification in Whipple for the significant motivation
test." Such a situation indicates that Whipple does not offer a firm
basis of support for either test.
In the dominant stockholder-employee situation, the kinds of
evidence that will generally be weighed by the trier of fact in deter-
mining either degree of motivation will be taxpayer's testimony, the
relationship between taxpayer's salary and the value of his investment,
the possibility that the corporation would have gone out of business
without taxpayer's advances, and the degree of control that taxpayer
had over the hiring and firing of corporate employees. With these
kinds of evidence, it would be difficult for taxpayer to prove that his
dominant and primary motivation in advancing monies was the pro-
tection of his employment.
On the other hand, the significant motivation test is so much more
easily satisfied with these kinds of evidence that, as was pointed out
in the concurring opinion in Weddler there is a danger that the re-
sults will invariably be in favor of taxpayer. However, this test would
seem to be the more appropriate in light of the fact that section 166
does not demand more of a business debt than that it be created or
acquired in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer
that the loss from its worthlessness be incurred in the taxpayer's trade
or business."
PHILIP A. WICKY
45
 417 F.2d at 1187.
46 427 F.2d at 282.
47 325 F.2d at 852.
48
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d)(2)(A).
49
 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d)(2) (13).
, 48 or
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